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Product Identifiers

PublisherOxford University Press, Incorporated

ISBN-100198777868

ISBN-139780198777861

eBay Product ID (ePID)220487872

Product Key Features

Number of Pages296 Pages

Publication NameLegislative Institutions and Lawmaking in Latin America

LanguageEnglish

Publication Year2016

SubjectGovernment / General, General, World / Caribbean & Latin American

TypeTextbook

Subject AreaLaw, Political Science

AuthorGeorge Tsebelis

SeriesOxford Studies in Democratization Ser.

FormatHardcover

Dimensions

Item Height0.8 in

Item Weight19.9 Oz

Item Length9.5 in

Item Width6.3 in

Additional Product Features

Intended AudienceScholarly & Professional

LCCN2015-956091

Dewey Edition23

ReviewsBy including in their theoretical model the ideological positions of partisan executive and legislative players, Aleman and Tsebelis significantly advance our understanding of lawmaking in Latin America. Rarely does an edited collection exhibit such consistency between the overall theoretical argument and the case chapters, and rarely are case chapters so rigorous.

IllustratedYes

Dewey Decimal328.8

Table Of Content1. Introduction: Legislative Institutions and Agenda Setting2. Presidential Agenda Authority in Plurality-Led Congresses: Agenda Setting Prerogatives without Majority Support3. Agenda Setting and Gridlock in a Multiparty Coalitional Presidential System: The Case of Brazil4. Presidential Power, Legislative Rules, and Lawmaking in Chile5. The Unrealized Potential of Presidential Coalitions in Colombia6. Parliamentary Agenda-Setting in Latin America: The Case of Mexico7. Strong Presidents, Weak Parties, and Agenda Setting: Lawmaking in Democratic Peru8. Agenda Setting and Lawmaking in Uruguay9. Conclusions

SynopsisIn this volume, twelve experts on Latin American politics investigate the ways in which the interaction between legislative institutions and the policy positions of key actors affects the initiation and passage of legislation, covering seven Latin American Countries: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Peru, and Uruguay. These seven presidential systems vary widely in terms of their legislative institutions and the position of relevant actors.The introduction provides a framework to understand the interaction of legislative majorities, political institutions, and policy position, and each chapter begins with a description of the constitutional and congressional rules that allocate powers to propose, amend, and veto legislation. The authors then identify the political actors who have these prerogatives and apply the framework to show how their policy positions and relative strengths influence legislative decision-making. The findings are consistent with the basic argument of the book that presidents with extensive legislative powers may be constrained by the positions of their legislative allies, whereas weaker presidents may be well-positioned to build successful coalitions to achieve their legislative goals. The essays in this volume demonstrate that institutional design, which determines the allocation of legislative powers, must be considered along with the policy preferences of key legislative actors in order to construct a full picture of law-making.Oxford Studies in Democratization is a series for scholars and students of comparative politics and related disciplines. Volumes concentrate on the comparative study of the democratization process that accompanied the decline and termination of the cold war. The geographical focus of the series is primarily Latin America, the Caribbean, Southern and Eastern Europe, and relevant experiences in Africa and Asia. The series editor is Laurence Whitehead, Senior Research Fellow, Nuffield College, University of Oxford., In this volume, twelve experts on Latin American politics investigate the ways in which the interaction between legislative institutions and the policy positions of key actors affects the initiation and passage of legislation, covering seven Latin American Countries: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Peru, and Uruguay. These seven presidential systems vary widely in terms of their legislative institutions and the position of relevant actors. The introduction provides a framework to understand the interaction of legislative majorities, political institutions, and policy position, and each chapter begins with a description of the constitutional and congressional rules that allocate powers to propose, amend, and veto legislation. The authors then identify the political actors who have these prerogatives and apply the framework to show how their policy positions and relative strengths influence legislative decision-making. The findings are consistent with the basic argument of the book that presidents with extensive legislative powers may be constrained by the positions of their legislative allies, whereas weaker presidents may be well-positioned to build successful coalitions to achieve their legislative goals. The essays in this volume demonstrate that institutional design, which determines the allocation of legislative powers, must be considered along with the policy preferences of key legislative actors in order to construct a full picture of law-making. Oxford Studies in Democratization is a series for scholars and students of comparative politics and related disciplines. Volumes concentrate on the comparative study of the democratization process that accompanied the decline and termination of the cold war. The geographical focus of the series is primarily Latin America, the Caribbean, Southern and Eastern Europe, and relevant experiences in Africa and Asia. The series editor is Laurence Whitehead, Senior Research Fellow, Nuffield College, University of Oxford., In this volume, twelve experts on Latin American politics investigate the ways in which the interaction between legislative institutions and the policy positions of key actors affects the initiation and passage of legislation, covering seven Latin American Countries: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Peru, and Uruguay. These seven presidential systems vary widely in terms of their legislative institutions and the position of relevant actors.The introduction provides a framework to understand the interaction of legislative majorities, political institutions, and policy position, and each chapter begins with a description of the constitutional and congressional rules that allocate powers to propose, amend, and veto legislation. The authors then identify the political actors who have these prerogatives and apply the framework to show how their policy positions and relative strengths influence legislative decision-making. The findings are consistent with the basic argument of the book that presidents with extensive legislative powers may be constrained by the positions of their legislative allies, whereas weaker presidents may be well-positioned to build successful coalitions to achieve their legislative goals. The essays in this volume demonstrate that institutional design, which determines the allocation of legislative powers, must be considered along with the policy preferences of key legislative actors in order to construct a full picture of law-making. Oxford Studies in Democratization is a series for scholars and students of comparative politics and related disciplines. Volumes concentrate on the comparative study of the democratization process that accompanied the decline and termination of the cold war. The geographical focus of the series is primarily Latin America, the Caribbean, Southern and Eastern Europe, and relevant experiences in Africa and Asia. The series editor is Laurence Whitehead, Senior Research Fellow, Nuffield College, University of Oxford., This volume investigates the ways in which the interaction between legislative institutions and the policy positions of key actors affects the initiation and passage of legislation. The volume covers seven Latin American countries: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Peru, and Uruguay.

LC Classification NumberJL963